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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
§78-2-2(3)0)(2002)(appeal from final judgment). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: 
Did the trial court err by dismissing Wintergreen's complaint, since Wintergreen 
properly alleged all the elements of inverse condemnation claims under the state and federal 
constitutions? (Issue Preserved: R. 92-93, 88) 
Standard of Appellate Review: "When reviewing a dismissal based on rule 
12[(b)(6)], an appellate court must accept the material allegations of the complaint as true 
... and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly appears that [Plaintiff] can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.« 795 P.2d 622, 
624 (Utah 1990). 
ISSUE II: 
Did the trial court err by dismissing Wintergreenfs Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Claims for 
Relief for inverse condemnation under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution on the 
ground that UDOT's initiation of direct condemnation proceedings under state statute against 
parts of Wintergreen's land precluded Wintergreen's state constitutional inverse 
condemnation claims with respect to all of Wintergreen's land detrimentally affected by 
UDOPs conduct? (Issue Preserved: R. 88-92) 
Standard of Appellate Review: In reviewing a trial court's grant of a defendant's 
1 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, an appellate court accepts 
the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interprets those facts and all inferences 
drawn from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff Such dismissal is a question of 
law that is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's ruling. Oakwood 
Village LLC v. Albertsons. Inc.. 2004 UT 101, ^99 104 P.3d 1226. 
ISSUE HI: 
Did the trial court err by dismissing Wintergreenfs First, Second and Third Claims for 
Relief for inverse condemnation under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution on the ground that UDOTs initiation of direct 
condemnation proceedings under state statute against parts of Wintergreen's land precluded 
Wintergreen's federal constitutional inverse condemnation claims with respect to all of 
Wintergreen's land detrimentally affected by UDOTs conduct? (Issue Preserved: R. 88-92) 
Standard of Appellate Review: In reviewing a trial court's grant of a defendant's 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, an appellate court accepts 
the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interprets those facts and all inferences 
drawn from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Such dismissal is a question of 
law that is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's ruling. Oakwood 
Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc.. 2004 UT 101, %9, 104 P.3d 1226. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
UNITED STATES CONST, amend. V. 
[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
2 
UTAH CONST, art. I, §22. 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation. 
UTAH CODE § 78-34-10. Compensation and damages — How assessed. 
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered by any of 
the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
(1) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements thereon 
appertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate or interest therein; and 
if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each estate or interest 
therein shall be separately assessed; 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, 
the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason 
of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the 
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff; 
(3) if the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by the 
construction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such damages; 
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each estate or 
interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the construction of the improvement 
proposed by the plaintiff. If the benefit shall be equal to the damages assessed under 
Subdivision (2) of this section, the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no 
compensation except the value of the portion taken; but if the benefit shall be less 
than the damages so assessed, the former shall be deducted from the latter, and the 
remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition to the value of the portion 
taken; 
(5) if the property sought to be condemned consists of water rights or part of a water 
delivery system or both, and the taking will cause present or future damage to or 
impairment of the water delivery system not being taken, including impairment of the 
systemsfs carrying capacity, an amount to compensate for the damage or impairment; 
(6) if land on which crops are growing at the time of service of summons is sought to 
be condemned, the value that those crops would have had after being harvested, 
taking into account the expenses that would have been incurred cultivating and 
harvesting the crops; and 
(7) As far as practicable compensation must be assessed for each source of damages 
separately. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, disposition in the court below 
This case presents the question whether the Utah legislature, by enacting a statute, 
may prohibit a property owner from enforcing individual state and federal constitutional 
rights in a Utah state court. It is elementary that statutes cannot trump constitutional rights, 
and yet the trial court below erroneously so held. 
Wintergreen owned approximately 121 acres of land in Tooele consisting of several 
parcels of land on both sides of State Road 36. Wintergreen had assembled the land in order 
to build the North Town Shopping Center. UDOT embarked on a project to widen SR-36 and 
brought three separate direct condemnation lawsuits to acquire parts of Wintergreen's land 
on each side of SR-36. UDOT obtained orders of immediate occupancy in each of the three 
direct condemnation lawsuits and the reconstruction of SR-36 has proceeded. 
As part of the reconstruction project, and in addition to filing the three direct 
condemnation lawsuits, UDOT also permanently blocked off a street serving Wintergreen's 
land; transformed another street into a right-in, right-out-only turnoff; and erected barriers 
to prevent traffic from crossing from Wintergreen's land on one side of SR-36 to 
Wintergreen's land on the other side of SR-36. 
Each of the three direct condemnation lawsuits brought by UDOT treated different 
individual segments of Wintergreen's total landholding as the relevant "larger parcel." Even 
as so limited, UDOT refused to provide Wintergreen statutory severance damages in the three 
direct condemnation lawsuits. Moreover, UDOT also refused to compensate Wintergreen for 
4 
harm to Wintergreen's total 121-acre landholding resulting from the fragmentation of that 
land caused by the direct condemnations. UDOT also refused to compensate Wintergreen 
for the harm to Wintergreen's assembled land resulting from UDOT's physical actions 
blocking off and obstructing streets to Wintergreen's land. 
Wintergreen therefore filed a fourth, inverse condemnation, lawsuit in order (1) to 
expand the inquiry to properly focus on the harm resulting from UDOT's direct 
condemnation and physical conduct to Wintergreen's land as an integrated economic unit; 
and (2) to assert state and federal constitutional claims in light of that broader focus. 
The trial court below granted UDOT's motion to dismiss Wintergreen's inverse 
condemnation lawsuit in its entirety on the ground that the statutory direct condemnation 
proceedings brought by UDOT prohibited Wintergreen from asserting state and federal 
constitutional claims, either in a separate lawsuit or as counterclaims in a consolidated action. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Plaintiff-Appellant Wintergreen Group, LC is a Utah limited liability company 
doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. ("Wintergreen"). (R. 23 f3) 
2. Defendant State of Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") is the Utah state 
entity with general responsibility for the state's highway system. (R. 23 ^ [4) 
3. Sometime before 2004, UDOT embarked on a project to widen State Road SR-36 
in the City of Tooele and to conduct ancillary construction and improvements ("UDOT SR-
36 Project"). (R. 23 f6) 
4. Wintergreen owned several parcels of land in the City of Tooele, located on the 
5 
east and west sides of State Road 36 (SR-36), between 2000 North and 2400 North Streets 
("Wintergreen's land"). (R. 23 1J5) 
5. Wintergreen's land is depicted on a portion of the Tooele Master Transportation 
Plan Map attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 1. (R. 81) 
6. Wintergreen's land consisted of a total of about 121.116 acres. (R. 23 f5) 
7. Prior to the UDOT SR-36 Project, Wintergreen intended to use all its land, both 
on the east and west sides of SR-36, for construction of the North Town Shopping Center as 
an integrated economic unit. (R. 22-23 f 7) 
8. On March 30, 2004, UDOT served Wintergreen with summons and a complaint 
for condemnation in Case Number 040300459 ("Case 459 direct condemnation"), in which 
UDOT sought to condemn fee title to a strip of land of .275 acres belonging to Wintergreen 
located on the east side of SR-36 along 2400 North Street. (R. 22 f 8) 
9. On April 15,2004, UDOT served Wintergreen with summons and a complaint for 
condemnation in Case Number 040300524 ("Case 524 direct condemnation"), in which 
UDOT sought to condemn several parts of a 16.666-acre parcel of land owned by 
Wintergreen located on the east side of SR-36, bordered by 2000 North on the south, 400 
East on the east, and 2200 North on the north. The Case 524 direct condemnation sought to 
condemn fee title to two parcels of the land together comprising 2.183 acres, one perpetual 
easement of .111 acres, and three temporary easements amounting to .022 acres. (R. 22 f)) 
10. Also on April 15, 2004, UDOT served Wintergreen with summons and a 
complaint for condemnation in Case Number 040300525 ("Case 525 direct condemnation"), 
6 
in which UDOT sought to condemn fee title to a strip of land of 2.147 acres belonging to 
Wintergreen located on the west side of SR-36 along the boundaries of four adjacent parcels 
of land owned by Wintergreen which collectively amounted to 104.175 acres. (R. 21-22 f^lO) 
11. On July 1,2004, the trial court entered an Order of Immediate Occupancy in each 
of the Case 459, Case 524 and Case 525 direct condemnation lawsuits. (R. 21 ^ [11) 
12. As a proximate result of the UDOT SR-36 Project, Wintergreen's land now 
consists of one 14.483-acre parcel on the east side of SR-36 burdened by a perpetual 
easement and three temporary easements, and four adjacent parcels along the west side of 
SR-36 consisting of 102.028 acres (116.511 acres hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Wintergreen's remaining land"). (R. 211fl2) 
13. Wintergreen's remaining land has been reduced in total size to 116.511 acres, 
subject to a perpetual easement and three temporary easements. (R. 21 Tfl3) 
14. UDOT also took the physical action of permanently blocking off from all traffic 
a formerly open tumoff from SR-36 onto 2000 North Street, which borders the southern 
boundary of Wintergreen's remaining land located on the east side of SR-36. (R. 21 ^ [14) 
15. UDOT further took the physical action of rendering 2200 North into a right-in, 
right-out-only street from SR-36, even though 2200 North is designated on the Tooele Master 
Transportation Plan as an ordinary street connecting Wintergreen's land on each side of SR-
36. (R. 211f 15) 
16. UDOT additionally took the physical action of closing off 2200 North westbound 
from SR-36 toward the Overtake Subdivision located immediately west of Wintergreen's 
7 
remaining land, even though 2200 North is designated on the Tooele Master Transportation 
Plan as an ordinary street traversing Wintergreen's land toward the Overtake Subdivision. (R. 
20fl7) 
17. As a proximate result of UDOT's condemnation of part of Wintergreen's land; 
UDOT's physically permanently blocking off from all traffic a formerly open tumoff from 
SR-36 onto 2000 North Street; UDOT's physically rendering of 2200 North Street into a 
right-in, right-out-only street from SR-36; and UDOT's physically closing off of 2200 North 
westbound from SR-36 toward the Overlake Subdivision, all the parcels of Wintergreen's 
remaining land have been isolated from each other, Wintergreen has been prevented from 
developing its land into the North Town Shopping Center as an integrated economic unit, and 
Wintergreen's remaining land has been substantially reduced in value. (R. 20 f 18) 
18. In the three direct condemnation lawsuits, UDOT offered Wintergreen no 
statutory severance damages and nothing for the resulting harm to Wintergreen's land as a 
whole integrated economic unit. (R. 20 [^20; R. 154) 
19. On March 18, 2005, Wintergreen therefore filed an "Inverse Condemnation" 
lawsuit, seeking relief under the Just Compensation Clauses of the Utah and Federal 
Constitutions, in order (1) to expand the inquiry to properly focus on the harm to 
Wintergreen's land as a whole integrated economic unit resulting from UDOT's physical and 
condemnation conduct; and (2) to assert state and federal constitutional claims in light of 
that broader focus. (R. 1-24) 
20. On March 6,2006, the trial court entered final judgment granting UDOT's motion 
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to dismiss Wintergreen's "Inverse Condemnation" lawsuit in its entirety for failure to state 
a claim, on the sole ground that UDOT's three statutory direct condemnation lawsuits 
precluded the filing of Wintergreen's inverse condemnation lawsuit asserting claims under 
the constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States. (R. 169-77 at 172) 
21. On March 31,2006, Wintergreen filed its Notice of Appeal to this Court. (R. 183) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wintergreen's complaint alleged inverse condemnation claims under the Utah and 
Federal Constitutions. The trial court erroneously dismissed Wintergreen's complaint on the 
ground that such claims are precluded by statutory direct condemnation proceedings brought 
byUDOT. 
Wintergreen contends its complaint stated claims for relief under this court's existing 
interpretations of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. However, Wintergreen also 
suggests that such jurisprudence should be revised to more closely follow the Framers1 intent. 
Wintergreen's complaint also states claims for relief under such revised jurisprudence. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Wintergreen's Complaint Properly Alleges Both State and Federal Constitutional 
Inverse Condemnation Claims Sufficient to Overcome UDOTs Motion to Dismiss 
A. Standard of Judicial Review on a Motion to Dismiss Favors Wintergreen 
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "is to challenge the formal 
sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of a case." 
Whipple v. AmericanForkImgationCo..910P.2d 1218.1220 (Utah 1996). Thus. Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires only that a complaint contain a "short and plain statement 
... showing that the pleader is entitled to relief1 and "a demand for judgment for the relief. 
All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 841 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah Ct.App.1992). "A 
dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted by the trial court only if it is clear that 
a party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of 
its claim." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). 
B. Wintergreen1 s Complaint Properly Alleges State and Federal Constitutional 
Claims 
1. Wintergreen's Complaint Properly Alleges State Constitutional Claims 
a. Nature and Elements of State Inverse Condemnation Claims 
The Just Compensation Clause of the Utah Constitution provides: "Private property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." UTAH CONST, art. I, 
Sec. 22. That Clause protects "private property" from governmental "taking" or "damaging" 
for "public use" without payment of just compensation. Farmers New World Life Insurance 
10 
Co. v. Bountiful City. 803 P.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Utah 1990); see generally 3 Sands, Libonati 
& Martinez, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, §§ 16.53.10-16.53.50; Martinez & Libonati, STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, A Transactional Approach 312-39 (2000). 
Three different scenarios give rise to Just Compensation claims under Article I, 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution: (1) "Direct condemnation" occurs, for example, when 
a private home that lies in the path of a proposed freeway is purchased "directly" by UDOT. 
In that scenario, there is no question that (A) "private property" (the home), (B) a "taking" 
(expropriation of the home), and (C) a "public use" (freeway), are all present. UDOT 
unquestionably is required to initiate a direct condemnation proceeding and pay fair market 
value to the owner in that setting. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-34-1-78-34-20. 
(2) "Inverse condemnation" occurs when private property is taken or damaged for 
public use and either (A) the government has not initiated direct condemnation proceedings 
at all, or (B) as in this case, the property owner asserts that the direct condemnation 
proceedings which the government has brought will not provide the constitutionally required 
"just compensation" to the owner. Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v. Bountiful City, 
803 P.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Utah 1990); see also 3 Sands, Libonati & Martinez, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW, § 21:14 (de facto takings); § 21:16 (precondemnation blight). 
Inverse condemnation law in Utah has followed a particularly tortuous path. This 
court initially held that the state Just Compensation Clause was self-executing, and did not 
require legislative grace to implement it. Webber v. Salt Lake City. 40 Utah 221,224,120 
P. 503, 504 (1911). The court later reversed itself, however, holding instead that no claim 
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could be brought directly under the state constitution absent implementing legislation. 
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960). Then in 1990, the 
court reversed itself again, joining the vast majority of state courts in holding that such a 
claim can be brought. Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622,630-34 (Utah 1990). 
Constant resort to first principles therefore is indispensable to keeping one's bearings 
in the field. The foundational principle of inverse condemnation law is that "The tendency 
under our system is too often to sacrifice the individual to the community." Stockdale v. Rio 
Grande Western Rv. Co.. 28 Utah 201, 203, 77 P. 849, 852 (1904). Like the analogous 
provision in the federal constitution's Fifth Amendment, the Utah Just Compensation Clause 
"was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." U.S. CONST. 
AMEND. V; Armstrong v. United States. 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960). 
In determining whether Wintergreen's complaint properly alleges inverse 
condemnation claims under the Utah constitution, therefore, both principles of civil 
procedure as well as the substantive policies underlying inverse condemnation theory counsel 
that Wintergreen's complaint should be upheld against UDOT's motion to dismiss. 
b. Wintergreen Properly Alleged Each Element of State Inverse 
Condemnation Claims 
Wintergreen properly alleged two "taking" claims (Claims 4 and 5) and a "damaging" 
claim (Claim 6) under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution as presently construed. 
(1) "Private Property" 
Wintergreen alleged that it owns "private property" in the form of fee title ownership 
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to approximately 121.116 acres of land in Tooele. (R. 23 ^|5); Farmers New World Life Ins. 
Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241,1244 (Utah ^(^("'property' includes but is not limited 
to land'1); Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990)("some 
protectible interest"; lease). 
(2) "Public Use" 
UDOT's reconstruction of SR-36 was for a "public use," because it was undertaken 
to "promote the public interest, and ... tends to develop the great natural resources of the 
[state]." (R. 17 | 41 ; R. 16 f!5; R. 15 1J52); Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371, 373 
(1904)(irrigation ditches); see also Highland Bov Gold Min. Co. v. Stricklev. 28 Utah 215, 
78 P. 296 (1904)(roads and tramways for mining industry). 
(3) "Taking" 
A ''taking" under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution as presently construed 
is "any substantial interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its 
value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree 
abridged or destroyed." Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d at 626 (citations 
omitted). Wintergreen alleged "UDOT's conduct substantially interfered with and destroyed 
or materially lessened the value of [Wintergreen's] remaining lands." (R. 17 (Claim 4, ffi[38-
41) at Tf 39). Wintergreen also alleged "UDOT's conduct in substantial degree abridged or 
destroyed [Wintergreen's] right to use and enjoyment of [Wintergreen's] remaining lands." 
(EL 16-17 (Claim 5, fl[42-45) at 143). 
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(4) "Damaging" 
A "damaging" under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution as presently 
construed requires "some physical disturbance of a right, either public or private, which the 
owner enjoys in connection with his property and which gives it additional value, and which 
causes him to sustain a special damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained 
by the public generally... with a perceptible effect on the present market value." Colman v. 
Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d at 626 (turbulence from state pumping water from Great 
Salt Lake destroying underwater brine canals). Such interference must be "physical and 
permanent, continuous, or recurring." Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 
803 P.2d at 1244 (diminution of value and cost of repairs to mall from city's temporary 
diversion of city creek during construction of culvert for creek). 
Wintergreen properly alleged such elements of a "damaging" claim as follows: 
% 47. UDOT through the physical conduct of failure to open 2200 North westbound 
from SR-36, rendering of 2200 North as a right-in, right-out street in relation to SR-
36, and blocking of 2000 North from traffic in relation to SR-36, destroyed Plaintiffs 
right to develop its remaining lands into the North Town Shopping Center as an 
integrated economic unit, which gave Plaintiffs remaining lands additional value. 
f 48. UDOT's conduct caused Plaintiff special damage in excess of that sustained by 
the public generally because Plaintiffs remaining East Side land was rendered isolated 
from Plaintiffs remaining West Side land, as well as from the areas surrounding 
Plaintiffs remaining East Side land, because Plaintiff no longer has access to or from 
SR-36 on 2000 North, and has no access to southbound SR-36 from 2200 North, but 
instead must travel a circuitous route eastward on 2000 North or 2200 North, then 
north on 400 East, then finally south on SR-36. 
^ 49. Such damage sustained by Plaintiff is a definite physical injury cognizable to the 
senses because Plaintiffs remaining lands are isolated from each other as well as from 
SR-36 to a substantial degree. 
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[^ 50. Such damage sustained by Plaintiff has a perceptible effect on the present 
market value of Plaintiffs remaining lands because all of such lands have been 
isolated from each other, Plaintiff has been prevented from developing its lands into 
the North Town Shopping Center as an integrated economic unit, and Plaintiffs 
remaining lands have been substantially diminished in value. 
(R. 15-16 (Claim 6,1J1J46-52) at ffif 47-50). 
2. Wintergreen's Complaint Properly Alleges Federal Constitutional 
Claims 
a. The Federal Just Compensation Clause is Self-Executing Against 
the State 
The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution protects "private property" from governmental "taking" for "public use" without 
payment of just compensation. U.S. CONST, amend. V. The Fifth Amendment's Just 
Compensation Clause is self-executing and applies to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause. U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, Sec. 1; Jacobs v United States, 
290 U.S. 13 (1933); Chicago. B. & O. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,241,17 S. Ct 581,586 
(1897). 
The United States Supreme Court on innumerable occasions has applied the federal 
Just Compensation Clause against States directly. See, e.g. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 
544 U.S. 528, 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005)(suit challenging Hawaii state statute); Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606,617 (2001)(MThe Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, [is] 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment...."); Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. 480 U.S. 470, 481 n.10 (1987)(restriction of the federal Just 
Compensation Clause "is applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."); Webb's 
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Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,160 (1980)(federal Just Compensation 
Clause "prohibition, of course, applies against the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment"). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has applied the Just Compensation 
Clause against States without even bothering to mention the principle. See, e.g.. Brown v. 
Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
This court also has recently acknowledged that the federal Just Compensation Clause 
provides a direct action against the State of Utah. In Smith v. Price Development Company. 
2005 UT 87, 125 P.3d 945 this court held that the State of Utah could not enforce a statute 
that would have allowed the State to seize one-half of punitive damages awards in suits 
between private parties. The State was joined as a party defendant in the trial court, which 
held that the statute "effected an unconstitutional taking...in violation of article I, section 22 
of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution." Id. f 1 (emphasis added). On appeal, this court defined the issue as "whether 
the Smiths' interest, if any, was 'taken' within the meaning of article I, section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution." Id. 1fl3 (emphasis added). The Court affirmed the judgment against the State. 
In addition to a substantive right under the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation 
Clause, Wintergreen also has an independent substantive right to injunctive relief against 
UDOT under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young. Verizon Maryland. Inc. v. Public Service 
Com'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635,645 (2002)("In determining whether the doctrine of Ex 
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Parte Young [applies,] a court need only conduct a 'straightforward inquiry into whether [the] 
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized 
as prospective."' (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho. 521 U.S. 261,296 (1997)); 
Ex Parte Young. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Here, Wintergreen sought injunctive relief, inter alia, 
"mandating Defendant UDOT to open 2200 North westbound from SR-36; to render 2200 
North as a four-way intersection at SR-36, with appropriate traffic signal devices; [and] to 
remove the obstruction of 200 North from traffic to and from SR-36 northbound and 
southbound...." (R. 14 (Prayer for Relief) at f (d)(i)) 
b. Wintergreen Properly Alleged Each Element of Federal Inverse 
Condemnation Claims 
Wintergreen properly alleged three "taking" claims (Claims 1,2 and 3) under the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Constitution of the United States. 
(1) "Partial Taking" of All Wintergreen's Remaining Land 
Wintergreen's complaint properly alleges under the federal constitution that 
Wintergreen has suffered a "partial taking" of its remaining land in that "Defendant UDOT 
through the UDOT SR-36 Project imposed substantial economic harm on Plaintiffs 
remaining lands, Plaintiff has demanded compensation for such harm, and UDOT refuses to 
pay such compensation" and that "[s]uch conduct by UDOT constitutes a partial taking of 
Plaintiffs property." (R. 19-20 (Claim 1, If 19-24) at ffl 20,22 ); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 
533 U.S. 606, 617-18, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2457-58 (2001)("Where [governmental 
conduct]...places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial 
use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including 
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the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation 
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the 
government action."). 
(2) Total "Categorical Taking" of Reduction in Value of 
Wintergreen's Remaining Land 
Wintergreen's complaint also properly alleges under the federal constitution that 
Wintergreen has suffered a total "categorical taking" as a result of UDOT's conduct because 
"Defendant UDOT through the UDOT SR-36 Project imposed substantial economic harm 
on Plaintiffs remaining lands, Plaintiff has demanded compensation for such harm, and 
UDOT refuses to pay such compensation" and "[s]uch conduct by UDOT constitutes a 
categorical total taking of the reduction in value of Plaintiff s remaining lands resulting from 
UDOT's conduct." (R. 18-19 (Claim 2, ffif25-30) at ffif 26, 28); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 
533 U.S. 606,630-31,121 S. Ct. 2448,2464-65 (2001)(total categorical taking of narrowly-
defined property interest). 
(3) "Unconstitutional Condition" Taking 
Wintergreen's complaint also properly alleges under the federal constitution that 
Wintergreen has suffered a taking through imposition of an unconstitutional condition 
because "UDOT through the UDOT SR-36 Project" engaged in "excessive condemnation" 
by attempting to force Wintergreen to give up the value of Wintergreen's land as an 
integrated economic unit in exchange for the inadequate compensation UDOT offered 
Wintergreen in the three direct condemnation lawsuits. (R. 17-18 (Claim 3, ffi[31-37) at ffl 
32,35); Linde v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.. 544 U.S. 528,125 S. Ct. 2074,2087 (2005)(rejecting 
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"not substantially advance" test for takings, but retaining doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions). 
II. Wintergreenfs State Constitutional Inverse Condemnation Claims are not Precluded 
by UDOT's Statutory Direct Condemnation Lawsuits 
The trial court dismissed Wintergreen's Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Claims for Relief for 
inverse condemnation under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution on the ground that 
UDOT's initiation of direct condemnation proceedings under state statute against parts of 
Wintergreen's land precluded Wintergreen's state constitutional inverse condemnation claims 
with respect to all of Wintergreen's land detrimentally affected by UDOT's conduct. (R. 169-
77 at 172) 
The trial court thereby erroneously elevated state legislation over state constitutional 
rights. 
A. The Three Direct Condemnation Lawsuits Brought by UDOT Will Not 
Provide Wintergreen With Constitutionally Adequate Recovery 
Article I, Section 22 provides a "textual constitutional right" to compensation. 
Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder County Sch. Dist. 2000 UT 87, \ 20, 16 P.3d 533 
(Article I, Section 22 provides a "textual constitutional right to damages for one who suffers 
[that] constitutional tort."). 
Thus, this court need not determine whether it would formulate a damages remedy 
under its common law authority. Id. at 123 (damages remedy under this court's common law 
authority is provided only in "appropriate circumstances"). Instead, the court need only 
consider whether the three direct condemnation lawsuits brought by UDOT will provide 
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Wintergreen with constitutionally adequate recovery. 
1. Three Direct Condemnation Lawsuits Brought by UDOT Artificially 
Fragment Wintergreen's Property 
The three direct condemnation lawsuits brought by UDOT artificially fragment 
Wintergreen's 121 acres of land into three isolated segments. Such fragmentation results in 
denying constitutionally required "just compensation" to Wintergreen. 
Case 524 isolates a 16.666-acre parcel of land owned by Wintergreen on the east side 
of SR-36 as a separate segment and appropriates 2.183 acres in fee, imposes a permanent 
easement on .111 acre, and imposes three temporary easements on .022 acres. Case 525 
isolates four adjacent parcels of land owned by Wintergreen on the West side of SR36 
totaling approximately 104.175 acres as a separate segment and appropriates 2.147 acres in 
fee. Case 459 isolates 2400 North as a separate segment and appropriates .275 acres of 
Wintergreen's land for road surface. (R. 21-22 ffif 8-10) 
2. Impact of Fragmentation of Wintergreen's Land by Three Direct 
Condemnation Lawsuits Brought by UDOT 
a. Recovery Under Utah Code Section 78-34-10(1) for Land 
Actually Appropriated 
Utah Code Section 78-34-10 defines the recovery statutorily available to a landowner 
in direct condemnation proceedings. Subsection (1) provides for recovery of the value of the 
land actually appropriated. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10(1). Under Subsection (1), 
Wintergreen is entitled to compensation for the segments of land actually appropriated by 
UDOT. 
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b. Recovery Under Utah Code Section 78-34-10(2) for Harm to 
Land Remaining After an Actual Appropriation: Statutory 
"Severance Damages11 
Subsection (2) of Utah Code Section 78-34-10 provides: 
[I]f the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel the 
damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of 
its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the 
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff... . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34- 10(2)(emphases added). Under Subsection (2), Wintergreen is 
also entitled to compensation in the fomi of "severance" damages, consisting of Type-(i) 
damages to remaining land resulting from the fact of detachment of a portion of land from 
a "larger parcel" and Type-(ii) damages to remaining land resulting from construction on 
land actually appropriated. State v. Harvey Real Estate. 2002 UT 107, ffi[ 10-11, 57 P.3d 
1088. 
With respect to Type-(i) severance damages, (those resulting from the fact of 
detachment of a portion of land from a "larger parcel"), the amount of damages obtained is 
substantially affected by the definition of the "larger parcel" from which the land actually 
appropriated is detached. The difference is particularly dramatic in this case, since the 121-
acre assembled landholding has value because it is large enough to comprise a future 
shopping mall. UDOT artificially fragmented the relevant "larger parcel" into three isolated 
direct condemnation lawsuits. Not surprisingly, and almost inevitably, UDOT offered no 
severance damages in any of those three direct condemnations. ((R. 20 [^20; R. 154) 
With respect to Type-(ii) severance damages, (those resulting from construction on 
land actually appropriated), Wintergreen's recovery is limited to impacts to its remaining 
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land resulting from construction of improvements by UDOT on the appropriated land. State 
v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT 107, ^10, 57 P.3d 1088 ("Section 78-34-10 gives a 
landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused by the construction of the 
improvement made on the severed property. It does not give the landowner the right to 
present evidence of damages caused by other facets of the construction project."). 
Here, UDOT's physical conduct occurred primarily on land which UDOT already 
owned or controlled. Thus, UDOT permanently blocked off a street serving Wintergreenfs 
land; transformed another street into a right-in, right-out-only turnoff; and erected barriers 
to prevent traffic from crossing from Wintergreen's land on one side of SR-36 to 
Wintergreenfs land on the other side of SR-36. (R. 20-21 ffif 14,15,17,18) Thus, similarly, 
UDOT offered no severance damages in any of the three direct condemnations for such harm 
either. (R. 20 1f20; R. 154) 
c. Recovery Under Utah Code Section 78-34-10(3) for Land "no 
part" of Which is Actually Appropriated 
Subsection (3) Utah Code Section 78-34-10, provides: 
[I]f the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by the construction 
of the proposed improvement, the amount of such damages.... 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10(3). There are five independent reasons why Subsection (3) will 
not result in constitutionally adequate recovery here. First, the subsection is not applicable 
in this case because it allows recovery for damage to land only "if...no part thereof is taken". 
State v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P.2d 113 (1948)("If there is no taking of part of the 
property, [then recovery is available for] a damaging as contemplated by paragraph (3)... .ff). 
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UDOT unquestionably has "taken" part of Wintergreen's 121 acres in the three direct 
condemnation lawsuits. By the plain meaning of its express terms the statutory claim for 
damages provided by Subsection (3) is precluded by the statutory direct condemnation 
lawsuits brought by UDOT. Utah Public Employees Assfn v. State. 2006 UT 9, If 72, 131 
P.3d 208 (plain meaning of statute controls). 
Second, Subsection (3) by its terms applies only 1o damage caused "by the 
construction of the proposed improvement... ." In this case, part of Wintergreenfs harm 
resulted from UDOT's fragmenting of Wintergreen's "remaining land" through UDOT's filing 
of three separate direct condemnation lawsuits, each isolating a small segment of UDOT's 
land. Thus, instead of a unitary, 116.511-acre remaining land "larger parcel," the three direct 
condemnation lawsuits treated smaller bits of Wintergreen's land as the "larger parcel" in 
each case. The result was that UDOT offered no severance damages at all. Such harm caused 
by the fragmentation of Wintergreen's remaining land, however, is not recoverable under 
Subsection (3) because it is not caused "by the construction of the proposed improvement." 
Third, Subsection (3) has been construed narrowly by this court to apply only to 
"physical" impact "cognizable to the senses" on the owner's property. See Colman v. Utah 
State Land Board. 795 P.2d at 626 ("This Court has also defined... [Section 78-34-10(3) of] 
the eminent domain statute" as limited to physical impact "cognizable to the senses")(quoting 
Bd. ofEduc. of Logan City School Dist v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 314, 373 P.2d 697, 699 
(1962)). Here, although Wintergreen suffered such physical impacts as well, a major impact 
is on Wintergreen's legal rights to use, transfer and exclude others, resulting in devaluation 
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of its remaining land. Such harm, as discussed in Part ILB.4.C below, is constitutionally 
compensable under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
Fourth, Subsection (3) also has been construed narrowly by this court to include only 
"unavoidable injuries arising out of the proper construction of a public use which directly 
affect the market value of the abutting property... ." Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d at 1244. Thus, avoidable injury to Wintergreen's land caused by 
UDOT's physical conduct of permanently blocking off a street serving Wintergreen's land; 
transforming another street into a right-in, right-out-only turnoff; and erecting barriers to 
prevent traffic from crossing from Wintergreen's land on one side of SR-36 to Wintergreen's 
land on the other side of SR-36 would not be compensated under the statute. Farmers New 
World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City. 803 P.2d at 1245 ("Avoidable injuries not directly 
resulting from the construction or operation of a public improvement are not within the 
statute's protection.").1 In contrast, such harm is compensable under Article I, Section 22. 
Fifth, "[djamages arising out of carelessness or negligence or indifference in the 
construction of a utility upon land taken for public use are not damages contemplated by the 
statutes as recoverable under the principles of law pertaining to eminent domain 
proceedings."Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d at 1245, quoting 
Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 405, 407 (1935)). Such 
damages are "recoverable only in a negligence action." Id. at 1245-46. The Utah 
1
. It is not entirely clear whether this court in Farmers New World was construing the 
statute or Article I, Section 22. See Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 
P.2d at 1246 n.2 ("We acknowledge that the statute is inapplicable to this case and cite it only 
as a reflection of current legislative views on public policy."). 
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Governmental Immunity Act, however, immunizes the State from negligence liability in most 
cases. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-301 (5)(exceptions to negligence liability). InColman, 
though, this court held that the Legislature may not raise the shield of sovereign immunity 
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act to immunize itself against inverse condemnation 
claims under Article I, Section 22. Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d at 634-35 ("It 
can hardly be maintained that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, alone among all doctrines, 
is outside the limitations the people established [in the Utah Constitution]." And this court 
also has made clear that lf[ijntent is not an element of [an inverse condemnation] action...." 
Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d at 1246. 
In summary, the net impact on Wintergreen of UDOT's filing of the three direct 
condemnation lawsuits was twofold: (1) The fragmentation into three direct condemnation 
lawsuits, with their concomitant isolated "larger parcel" definitions, prevented Wintergreen 
from recovering for harm to the entirety of its remaining 116.511-acre tract; and (2) UDOTs 
filing of the three direct condemnation lawsuits also prevented Wintergreen from recovering 
for damage to its remaining land resulting from construction of improvements by UDOT 
which permanently blocked off a street serving Wintergreen's land; transformed another 
street into a right-in, right-out-only turnoff; and erected barriers to prevent traffic from 
crossing from Wintergreen's land on one side of SR-36 to Wintergreenfs land on the other 
side of SR-36. 
Utah Code Section 78-34-10 therefore does not provide Wintergreen constitutionally 
adequate recovery for the resulting harm. Such recovery under state law must be obtained by 
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an inverse condemnation action under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
B. State Legislature May not Preclude State Constitutional Claims 
1. The Role of This Court in Interpreting Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution 
In Colman v. Utah State Land Bd„ 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990), this court 
acknowledged that: 
The history of [the cases holding that the Utah Legislature by statute could hold itself 
immune from takings claims brought under Utah Constitution article I, section 22] 
shows that for a time the Court's concentration on the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
caused it to neglect this constitutional provision, which was designed to protect 
individual rights. This elevation of legislation and common law principles over a clear 
constitutional limitation strikes at the heart of constitutional government. The people 
of Utah established the Utah Constitution as a limitation on the power of government. 
It can hardly be maintained that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, alone among all 
doctrines, is outside of the limitations the people established. In Dean v. Rampton, 
556 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976), we stated: 
The purpose of a constitution is to provide an orderly foundation for 
government and to keep even the sovereign... within its bounds. Therefore, the 
legislative power itself must be exercised within the framework of the 
constitution. Accordingly, it has been so long established and universally 
recognized, as to be hardly necessary to state, that if a statutory enactment 
contravenes any provision of the constitution, the latter governs. 556 P.2d at 
206-07 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)). 
Id. at 634-35. See also Utah Public Employees Association v. State of Utah, 2006 UT 9 \ 18, 
131 P.3d 208 ("It is important to note that in a republican form of government, and as 
specified in our state constitution, the judicial power of the State is vested in this court."). 
In Colman, this court held that the" framers of the Utah Constitution expected [Article 
I, Section 22] to act as a real limit on the powers of the state...[and] certainly did not intend 
to allow state government to override the constitutional guarantee with a legislative 
enactment." Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d at 630. Thus, the court concluded 
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that the Legislature could not, through the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, trump a 
property owner's right to compensation under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
Id. at 634-35. More broadly, this court held that the Legislature could not use the concept of 
sovereign immunity, embodied in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, to shield itself from 
liability for takings or damagings of property under Article I, Section 22.2 In this case, this 
court is similarly called upon to hold that the Legislature, through the state's direct 
condemnation statutes, cannot trump a property owner's right to compensation under Article 
I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Legislature "unquestionably has the right to take or damage private property when 
necessary for public use." State v. District Court. 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502,505 (1937). The 
Legislature also unquestionably has the right to adopt procedures for the exercise of that 
power. Id. Direct condemnation statutes, including Utah Code Ann. Section 78-34-10, 
embody such procedures. But the substantive content of the constitutional protections 
afforded by Article I, Section 22, as confirmed by this court in Cohnan, is for this court to 
determine. As in Colman. this court must not "neglect this constitutional provision." The trial 
court's conclusion that the initiation of statutory direct condemnation proceedings precludes 
2
. Other state courts have taken a similar perspective on their role as protectors of 
individual property rights against state legislative action. See, e.g.. Buckeye Union Fire 
Insurance Company v. Employers Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 383 Mich. 630, 178 
N.W.2d 476 (1970)(state had acquired factory in tax foreclosure, and then let it deteriorate 
and become a nuisance; Michigan Supreme Court held state constitution's Just Compensation 
Clause covered the nuisance-type of "taking" involved and superseded state statute 
immunizing state); Bums v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County. 218 Va. 625, 238 
S.E.2d 823 (1977)(water discharged from county storm sewer caused $50,000 in damage to 
plaintiffs, home; Virginia Supreme Court held state constitution's Just Compensation Clause 
covered harm and superseded statutory governmental immunity). 
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the assertion of a constitutional claim under Article I, Section 22 did just that. 
2. Other States Allow Inverse Condemnation Claims Even if Direct 
Condemnation Lawsuits Have Been Brought by the Government 
Other state courts allow inverse condemnation claims-in the same lawsuit or in a 
separate action-even if direct condemnation lawsuits have been brought by the government.3 
Such uniform practice is not surprising, since considerations of judicial economy and 
the need for consistent judgments on statutory and constitutional claims are thereby assured. 
3- Wintergreen and UDOT Offered to Consolidate the Inverse 
Condemnation Claims and the Direct Condemnation Actions, But the 
Trial Court Refused to Do So 
Wintergreen here requested that the four cases should be consolidated, or in the 
alternative, that the three direct condemnation cases should be consolidated and 
Wintergreenfs inverse condemnation claims should be deemed counterclaims in those 
3
. See, e.g.. Brown v. State, 694 So.2d 1342, 1343-44(Ala. 1997)(inverse 
condemnation action properly transferred action back to original county for consolidation 
with state's direct condemnation action which was pending in original county and concerned 
portions of same property; trying inverse condemnation and direct condemnation actions in 
different counties could potentially result in inconsistent verdicts regarding same property 
and consolidation of actions would promote judicial economy); Block v. Orlando-Orange 
County Expressway Authority. 313 So.2d 75,76-77 (Fla. App. 1975)(constitutional inverse 
condemnation claim is a compulsory counterclaim in the direct condemnation lawsuit 
brought by the government); Flo-Rob. Inc. v. Colonial Pipeline Co.. 170 Ga. App. 650,652, 
317 S.E.2d 885,887 (1984)(separate actions required; "Though the law generally favors the 
prevention of a multiplicity of actions, it appears that condemnation law in Georgia rather 
strictly limits the relevant evidence in condemnation cases and therefore separate suits for 
different kinds of damages are not uncommon." Simon v. Dept. of Tramp., 245 Ga. [478], 
479,265 S.E.2d 777.1: Kohn Enterprises. Inc. v. City of Overland Park. 221 Kan. 230,24-35, 
559 P.2d 771,774-75 (1977)(landowner inverse condemnation claim for restriction of access 
properly tried together with direct condemnation action for improvement of portions of street 
and for intersection improvements); City of Austin v. Casiraghi. 656 S.W.2d 576, 581-82 
(1983)(inverse condemnation claim may be asserted separate from direct condemnation 
lawsuit). 
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consolidated cases. (R. 160-163). And in a letter to the trial court, UDOT conceded that 
Wintergreen's state inverse condemnation claims could be consolidated: 
"UDOT asks that the Article I, Section 22 claims either be dismissed as improper 
assertion of a counterclaim under Rule 13 or order that all Article I, Section 22 claims 
for just compensation be heard as part of the consolidated condemnation case(s)." 
(R. 161)(emphasis added) The trial court ignored the suggestions and instead dismissed all 
Wintergreen's inverse condemnation claims altogether. (R. 170) 
4. Substantive Content of Constitutional Protection Under Article I, 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution 
As set out in Part LB. 1. above, Wintergreen's complaint properly alleges both "taking" 
and "damage" claims under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution as interpreted by 
this court to date. And as demonstrated in Part II.A. above, Utah's statutory provisions for 
compensating harm to property caused by the SR-36 project undertaken by UDOT are 
inadequate to compensate Wintergreen for the resulting harm. The definitions of a "taking" 
and "damaging" under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, however, are in need 
of further refinement. 
a. Importance of Distinguishing Between Governmental Conduct 
and Impact on the Owner 
A large part of the difficulty in takings jurisprudence arises from the failure to 
adequately differentiate between government conduct, on one hand, and its impact on an 
owner, on the other.4 The distinction is critical, since what the government intends, on one 
4
. See, e.g.. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency. 535 U.S. 302,322 n.17,122 S.Ct. 1465,1478 n.17 (2002)(conflating governmental 
conduct and the impact on the owner); see generally John Martinez & Karen Martinez, A 
Prudential Theory for Providing a Federal Forum for Federal Takings Claims, 36 REAL 
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hand, may not be what the property owner experiences, on the other.5 Careful differentiation 
between those two sides of the equation is therefore critical for formulating a refined "taking" 
and "damaging" jurisprudence under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
b. Two Types of "Takings" Under Article I, Section 22 
(1) Direct Condemnation 
In "Direct Condemnation" types of takings, the governmental conduct is the 
purposeful exercise of the power of eminent domain and the impact on the owner is complete 
expropriation. In that setting: 
[It is] a settled principle of universal law, reaching back of all constitutional 
provisions, that the right to compensation [is] an incident to the exercise of the power 
of eminent domain; that the one [is] so inseparably connected with the other that they 
may be said to exist, not as separate and distinct principles, but as parts of one and the 
same principle; and that the legislature fcan no more take private property for public 
use with just compensation than if this restraining principle were incorporated into, 
and made part of, its State Constitution/ 
Chicago. B. & O. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,237-38,17 S. Ct. 581,585 (1897)(quoting 
Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 NJ.L. 129, 145, 1839 WL 2671, * 13, 34 Am. Dec. 184, 2 
Harrison 129 (N.J. 1839)). 
In this case, there is no dispute that Wintergreen will be entitled to just compensation 
for the lands directly appropriated by UDOT in the three direct condemnation lawsuits. 
PROPERTY,PROBATE&TRUST J. 445,453 (Fall 200 l)(discussing critical distinction between 
governmental conduct and the impact of such conduct on an owner). 
5
. "Intent is not an element of [an inverse condemnation] action." Farmers New World 
Life Insurance Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d at 1246; Proceedings and Debates of the 
Constitutional Convention, 327 (1898)("Damage is not always-in fact is not often 
contemplated or expected. It comes unlooked for as the consequence of an act which the 
party performs.")(Samuel R. Thurman)(Addendum Exh. 2, p.327). 
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(2) Functional Equivalent of Direct Condemnation 
The Functional Equivalent type of taking occurs when governmental conduct, other 
than the purposeful exercise of the power of eminent domain, has an impact on the owner 
that is indistinguishable from the direct condemnation setting, and therefore similarly entitles 
the owner to just compensation. 
Governmental conduct in this type of taking is defined in contrast to governmental 
conduct in direct condemnations. Any governmental conduct other than the purposeful 
exercise of the power of eminent domain suffices. Physical governmental conduct qualifies.6 
Regulatory governmental conduct, such as land use regulation, qualifies.7 And flawed direct 
condemnation conduct, as in this case, also qualifies.8 
On the impact side, the Functional Equivalent type of taking entails the practical 
ouster of a property owner's possession by the government.9 Examples include the 
government's seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike by coal 
6
. See, e.g.. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419.102 S.Ct 
3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982)(permanent physical occupation). 
7
. See generally 3 Sands, Libonati & Martinez, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, §§ 
16.53.10-16.53.50 (takings resulting from land use control). 
8
. See 3 Sands, Libonati & Martinez, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, § 21:14 (de facto 
takings); § 21:16 (precondemnation blight). 
9
. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.. 544 U.S. 528, 537, 125 S. Ct 2074, 2081 (2005); 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003,1014,112 S.Ct. 2886,120 L.Ed.2d 
798 (1992); Transportation Co. v. Chicago. 99 U.S. 635,642,25 L.Ed.336 (1879)("practical 
ouster of [the owner's] possession"). 
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miners,,() the government's occupation of a private warehouse leased by a private tenant1! and 
the permanent flooding of private land resulting from the construction of a dam.12 
In Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Rv. Co., 28 Utah 201,77 P. 849 (1904), however, 
this court defined a "taking" under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution as: 
... any substantial interference with private property which destroys or materially 
lessens its value or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any 
substantial degree abridged or destroyed... . 
Id. at 211, 77 P. at 852. See also Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d at 626. 
In accordance with this precedent, Wintergreen has alleged that UDOT's conduct in 
fragmenting Wintergreen's lai id t! u: oi ighthetl iree direct conden u: lationlaw suits, and! JDOTs 
physical conduct negatively affecting Wintergreen's land, are "takings1' under Stockdale. 
Thus, Wintergreen alleged "UDOT's conduct substantially interfered with and destroyed or 
materiall)- lessened the v alue of [Wintergreen's] remaining lands." (R 1 3 (Claim 4, ^ 3 8-41) 
at ^ 39). Wintergreen aNo I'llh'j'cd "UDO I "s romlm/i in sul^l;mti;il degree jhndjjed nr 
destroyed [Wintergreen's] right to use and enjoyment of [Wintergreen's] remaining lands." 
(R. 16-17 (Claim 5, ffi[42-45) atf 43): However, as discussed below, these claims may more 
proper!) I r \ unveil as' damaging11 claims under a reconstructed Utah takings jurisprudence. 
10
. United States v. Pewee Coal Co.. 3411IS, 114,71 S.Ct 670,95 L.Ed. 809 (1951). 
11
 .United States v. General Motors Corp., 32 \ I) S 5V I i»S S.O ^ I, M Lhd . 
(1945). 
12
. Pumpellyv.GreenBavCompany.80U.S. 166,13 Wall. 166,20L.Ed. 557(1871). 
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c. "Damaging" Under Article I, Section 22 
(1) Illinois Constitution 
In 1870 Illinois became the first state to amend its constitution to include "or 
damaged" in its Just Compensation Clause.13 The change was inserted because prior to that 
date, a "taking" had been interpreted to include only (a) direct condemnations and (b) only 
non-direct condemnations in which the governmental conduct caused an impact on the owner 
that constituted an actual physical intrusion onto an owner's property.14 The problem arose 
because the City of Chicago, in the course of improving its sewer and drainage system over 
a number of years, had raised the level of streets, sometimes as high as eight feet, leaving 
owners of adjacent stores and homes far below the level of the newly-elevated city streets. 
In Rigney v. City of Chicago. 102 111. 64 (1881), the rental value of such an owner's 
land had been reduced from $60 a month to $23, and the market value of the land had been 
reduced by two-thirds. IdL at 69. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the "or damaged" 
provision provided compensation in those circumstances. Focusing on the impact side of the 
equation, the court clarified that the error in providing compensation only for physical 
impacts originated from a mistaken view of the legal concept of property: 
Property, in its appropriate sense, means that dominion or indefinite right of user and 
disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things and subjects, and 
generally to the exclusion of all others, and doubtless this is substantially the sense in 
which it is used in the constitution; yet the term is often used to indicate the res or the 
13
. Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in 
Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 115 (1999). 
14
. Goodman's Peppermill Restaurant v. State of Illinois. 51 111. Ct. CI. 18,1999 WL 
33246456,4* (1999). 
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subject of the property, rather than the property itself, and it is evidently used in this 
sense in some of the cases in connection with the expression of physical injury, while 
at other times it is probably used in its more appropriate sense, as above mentioned. 
The meaning, therefore, of the expression "physical injury," when used in connection 
with the term property, would in any case necessarily depend upon whether the term 
property was used in the one sense or the other. To illustrate: If the lot and buildings 
of appellant are to be regarded as property, and not merely the subject of property, as 
strictly speaking they are, then there has clearly been no physical injury to it; but if by 
property is meant the right of user, enjoyment and disposition of the lot and buildings, 
then it is evident there has been a direct physical interference with appellant's 
property, and when considered from this aspect, it may appropriately be said the injury 
to the property is direct and physical.... 
Id at 78. Thus, "property" for constitutional purposes includes all the sticks in the bundle of 
rights: the rights i possess, to transfer, and to exclude others. The "or damaged" 
provision in the amended constitution, the court held, corrected a prior misperception: 
Under the constitution of 1848 it was essential to a right of recovery, as we have 
already seen, that there should be a direct physical injury to the corpus or subject of 
the property, such as overflowing it, casting sparks or cinders upon it, and the like; but 
under the present constitution it is sufficient if there is a direct physical obstruction 
or injury to the right of user or enjoyment by which the owner sustains some special 
pecuniary damage in excess of that sustained by the public generally, which, by the 
common law, would, in the absence of any constitutional or statutory provisions, give 
a right of action. 
Id. at 78 (emphasis added). Accordingly, governmental conduct which affects the value of 
intit! (Iiniinj'fi unpads MM Ilie Mplil'. ('» use or possess, to transfer, or to exclude others, is 
covered. The court-clarified that no I all such unpads aiv compensable, and ilial some 
reductions in value must be absorbed by the landowner as the cost of living in a civilized 
society: 
While it is clear that the present constitution was intended to afford redress in a 
certain class of cases for which there was no remedy under the old constitution, yet 
we think it equally clear that it was not intended to reach every possible injury that 
might be occasioned by a public improvement. There are certain injuries which are 
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necessarily incident to the ownership of property in towns or cities which directly 
impair the value of private property, for which the law does not, and never has, 
afforded any relief For instance, the building of a jail, police station, or the like, will 
generally cause a direct depreciation in the value of neighboring property, yet that is 
clearly a case of damnum absque injuria. So as to an obstruction in a public street,—if 
it does not practically affect the use or enjoyment of neighboring property, and 
thereby impair its value, no action will lie. In all cases, to warrant a recovery it must 
appear there has been some direct physical disturbance of a right, either public or 
private, which the plaintiff enjoys in connection with his property, and which gives 
to it an additional value, and that by reason of such disturbance he has sustained a 
special damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the public 
generally. 
Id. at 81 (emphases added). Given the court's prior discussion about the legal conception of 
"property/' the court's reference to a "direct physical disturbance," undoubtedly refers to 
physical15 governmental conduct, not to physical impact on the owner. Subsequent cases in 
Utah discussed below, however, erroneously interpreted Rigney as limited to physical 
impacts on the owner. 
Finally, the Illinois court carefully delineated the boundary between compensable 
impacts on value and noncompensable costs of living in a civilized society. Thus, only those 
impacts on value which constitute "a special damage with respect to his property in excess 
of that sustained by the public generally" were held compensable. IcL That formulation is 
consistent with the foundational principle of modern Just Compensation law that individuals 
should not be sacrificed to the community by having to bear public burdens that "in all 
fairness and justice, should be bome by the public as a whole." Stockdale v. Rio Grande 
15
. Modem Just Compensation jurisprudence, of course, has expanded protection 
against governmental conduct which is nonphysical, such as land use regulation, as well as 
against physical governmental conduct. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393,43 
S.Ct 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922); see generally 3 Sands, Libonati & Martinez, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW, §§ 16.53.10—16.53.50 (takings resulting from land use control). 
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Western Ry. Co., 28 Utah 201, 203, 77 P. 849, 852 (1904)("The tendency under our system 
is too often to sacrifice the individual to the community."); Armstrong v. United States, 364 
U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
i tah Constitution 
The Framers of the Utah Constitution coii fronted the sarcu j M i - '1cm of elevated streets 
and resulting uncompensated damage as had arisen in Illinois.16 The Framers therefore 
included the words "or damaged" in Utah's Just Compensation Clause because they also were 
concerned 11 ut ( 11 i-ri'd \ pn vl 111 > 11 mg "takings" without compensation would not protect owners 
whose property was neither actually npproprmlcd in ;,i JINY! condemnation, noi subjected to 
non-direct condemnation governmental conduct that resulted in physical intrusion impact on 
the owner's property. 
In twenty-Second Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Oregon 
Short Line R. Co.. 36 Utah 238,103 P 2 43 (1909), 1 his < •< >m I h< 1 11 hi i;( IU rise fr< »iii i i rai lr< >a< I 
did not amount to a "damaging" of adjacent buildings used for secular and religious purposes. 
Unfortunately, subsequent Utah decisions construed the opinion in Twenty-Second Corp. of 
1
 . See Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 326-27 (1898)("or 
damaged" provision is meant to extend to circumstances "where an elevated road was erected 
upon a street and while it did not touch the property of the abutting owner, did not destroy 
a brick, did not take a foot of his ground, it did affect his use and occupation of his premises 
very disastrously.")(Charles S. Varian) (Addendum Exh. 2, pp. 326-27) 
See also Proceedings andDebatesofthe Constitutional Convention, 328 (1898)(fT 
am in favor of retaining the words for damaged.11 recollect [when] I believe it was State 
street [in Salt Lake.City]—the grade had been established for some years, and the city came 
in and established a different grade and built the street up some ten feet higher than property 
abutting on it.... There is a spectacle where they could not get any damages for it [W]e 
should make them pay for whatever they take, and I believe the words for damaged1 should 
remain in the Constitution.ff)(Mr. Pierce)(Addendum Exh. 2, p. 328) 
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Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints to extend far beyond its holding and thereby 
severely limited the scope of the "or damaging" provision. Thus, in Colman v. Utah State 
Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990), this court limited "damagings" to "some physical 
disturbance of a right, either public or private, which the owner enjoys in connection with 
his property and which gives it additional value, and which causes him to sustain a special 
damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the public generally... with 
a perceptible effect on the present market value." Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 
P.2d at 626. Further, in Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 
1244 (Utah 1990), this court announced that "damagings" under the state constitution require 
an interference that is "physical and permanent, continuous, or recurring." 
Limiting "damagings" in that manner is inconsistent with the constitutional history and 
purpose of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, since the Framers of the Utah 
Constitution intended to protect against non-direct condemnation governmental conduct that 
did not result in a physical impact. This court's decision in Stockdale, albeit denominating 
it as a standard for "takings," actually articulated a perfectly usable "or damaging" standard 
that is consistent with the Framers1 intent: 
... any substantial interference with private property which destroys or materially 
lessens its value or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any 
substantial degree abridged or destroyed.... 
Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Rv. Co., 28 Utah 201, 211, 77 P. 849, 852 (1904). That 
standard more closely reflects an accurate interpretation of the Rigney decision as well. 
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d. Jury u. in 
The Framers of the Utah Constitution fully intended that a jury would determine 
whether the state has committed a compensable taking or damaging. See Proceedings and 
Debates of the Constitutional Convention 327 (1898)("...the means of arriving at the estimate 
are within the knowledge of men and can be adduced before a jury.")(Loiin Farr)(Addendum 
Exh. 2, p.327). See also UTAH CONST, art. I, §10 (Trial by Jury); International Harvester 
Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor, 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981 )(Utah Const, art. I, § 10 guarantees 
right iojuiy in.il n legal issu \ - « FTAH CODE ANN. §78 21-1 ("In actions for 
the recovery of specific real or personal property, with or withoiit damages, c- itloney 
claimed as due upon contract or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue 
of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered."); 
Richards v. Salt Lake-City. 4'J l H.ili ,'K, U\\ I <>K0| I« i111»III whether road debris on private lot 
warrants compensation is a question for the jury).17 
With instructions based upon the standards for "takings'1 and "damagingsf, set out 
above, a jury can properly determine whether a taking or damaging has occurred. 
in . Wintergreen's Federal Constitutional Inverse Condemnation Claims are not 
Precluded by UDOTs Direct Condemnation Lawsuits Under State Statute 
The trial court dismissed Wintergreen's First, Second and Third Claims for Relief for 
inverse condemnation under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
iJlfiiiiMI Slates (!onslilution on initiation of direct condemnation 
11
. See also Williams v. State ex rel. Dept of Transp.. 2000 OK CIV APP 19,135, 
998 P.2d 1245 (jury detennination of amount of damages must be necessarily preceded by 
jury detennination that inverse condemnation has occurred). 
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proceedings under state statute against parts of Wintergreen's land precluded Wintergreen's 
federal constitutional inverse condemnation claims with respect to all of Wintergreen's land 
detrimentally affected by UDOT's conduct. (R. 169-77 at 172) 
The trial court thereby erroneously elevated state legislation over federal constitutional 
rights. 
A. Federal Inverse Condemnation Claims in Federal Courts Against the Federal 
Government are Allowed even if Direct Condemnation Lawsuits Have Been 
Initiated by the Federal Government 
If the federal government brings a direct condemnation lawsuit in a federal district 
court, then a property owner may recover in the direct condemnation proceeding: (a) the 
value of the land appropriated, (b) damages to the remaining land caused by detachment of 
the appropriated land, and (c) damages to the remaining land caused by construction of 
improvements by the government on the appropriated land. U.S. v. Grizzard. 219 U.S. 180, 
183,31 S. Ct. 162, 163 (1911); cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10 (same principles). 
If the owner claims damage to the remaining land other than from these three causes, 
and if such inverse condemnation claim is for $10,000 or less, it may be asserted as a 
counterclaim in the federal district court under the Little Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2); 
U.S. v. 3.218.9 Acres of Land. 619 F.2d 288, 292 (3rd Cir. 1980). If such inverse 
condemnation claim exceeds $10,000, it may still be asserted, but it must be brought in a 
separate action in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1491. 
Therefore, "though he may have to appear in two proceedings to obtain the totality of that 
compensation... [t]he 5th Amendment, while it guarantees that compensation be just, does not 
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guarantee that it be meted out in a way more convenient to the landowner than to the 
sovereign." U.S. v. 101.88 Acres of Land. 616 F.2d 762, 772 (5th Cir. 1980). 
B Federal Inverse Condemnation Claims in Stati* Courts Against State 
Governments are Allowed Even if Direct Condemnation Lawsuits Have Been 
Initiated by the State Government under State Legislation 
As set out in Part LB.2 above, Wintergreen's complaint proj ^ alleges a "partial 
taking/1 a total "categorical taking" and an "unconstitutional condition" taking under the 
federal Just Compensation Clause. A state statutory direct condemnation proceeding does not 
override federal constitutionr: ts. 
The principle of federal supremacy prohibits state Legislatures from overriding federal 
constitutional rights through state legislation. U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2 ("This 
Constitution...shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
lumiul thereby, .ins I IMP ""» Nu < 'niisliluhnii <i" I avis nf m\ Stall In (lit Contrary 
notwithstanding.") 
Thus, for example, in Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida. 457 U. S. 496, 
102 S. Ct 2557,73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. 
federal courts. And in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 10i i - • • 
(1988), the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 preempts state notice-of-claim statutes in 
federal civil rights actions brought in state court. 
'Himhu'h "IK "Ifuvn ninilniiiiiitioii siidik n UHi uiiin-f mniwle Wintergreen's 
federal constitutional rights. C£ Com, of Mass. v. Bartlett. 266 F.Supp 390, amended i »ii 
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other grounds 384 F.2d 819, certiorari denied 390 U.S. 1003,88S.Ct. 1245,20L.Ed.2d 103 
(D. Mass. 1967)(state power of direct condemnation, like other powers of the state, is subject 
to Supremacy Clause, and the state's exercise of its power must yield when it conflicts with 
a paramount federal statute). 
C. Federal Ripeness Doctrine Does not Apply 
In Patterson v. American Fork City. 2003 UT 7, f 35,67 P.3d 466 this court held that 
a federal Just Compensation Clause claim was not ripe for adjudication in a Utah state court 
until the property owner had obtained a complete adjudication of a state inverse 
condemnation claim. Subsequently, in San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and County of San 
Francisco. 545 U.S. 323, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2506 (2005), the United States Supreme Court 
held: 
The requirement that aggrieved property owners must seek Compensation through the 
procedures the State has provided for doing so,1 [Williamson County Regional 
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172,194,105 S. Ct. 
3108, 87 L.E.2d 126 (1985)] does not preclude state courts from hearing 
simultaneously a plaintiffs request for compensation under state law and the claim 
that, in the alternative, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment 
of the Federal Constitution." 
Accordingly, Wintergreenfs inverse condemnation claims under the federal Just 
Compensation Clause can be adjudicated by the trial court simultaneously with Wintergreenfs 
inverse condemnation clause claims under the Utah Constitution on remand. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment dismissing Wintergreen's inverse condemnation complaint 
should be reversed. Since Wintergreen's appeal thereby will have resulted in substantial 
benefit to the piihl n as a result of the refinement in state inverse condemnation law brought 
about by this appeal, Wintergreen should be awarded its costs on appeal UTAH RULES APP. 
PROC. 34(b)(costs on appeal against the state of Utah); Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110, 
Tf 14, 22 1* id 1249 (successful appellant entitled to costs on appeal). 
DATED this 26th day of June, 2006. 
TI^EZ 
Plaintiff-Appellant Wintergreen 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 1: Map depicting Wintergreen's land. (R. 81) 
Exhibit 2: Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 315-16, 
326-329 (1898) 
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might refuse to give an examination, 
then 
The CHAIRMAN The question is on 
the amendment offered by the gentleman 
fiom Weber as amended 
Mr THURMAN "Unless waived by 
the accused with the consent of the 
State " 
Mr WHITNEY. I t is proposed to put 
all t h a t between 4 'examination' ' and 
"and 9 " 
Mr VARIAN No, after "commit-
ment " 
Mr EVANS (Weber) Let it go after 
the woid "magis t ra te " 
Mr. THURMAN You will have t o 
add to the word, "magis t ra te ," "unless 
examination is waived by the accused 
with the consent of the S ta te ." 
The CHAIRMAN. The article as pro-
posed to be amended would read as fol-
lows: 
Oifen&es heretofore required to be 
prosecuted by an indictment shall be 
prosecuted by information after examin-
ation and commitment by a magistrate, 
unless the examination be waived by 
the accused with the consent of the 
State. 
Mr. VAN HORNE. What is the rest 
of the amendment? 
Mr. VARIAN. That is all. 
Mr. BUYS. Mr. Chairman, it seems 
to me that this would waive the com-
mitment which I don't think we wish 
to waive. It seems to me it should be 
after "information" or the words "unless 
the examination be waived," as sug-
gested by the gentleman from Utah. 
Mr. WELLS. Mr. Chairman, I would 
like to ask s6meof these legal gentlemen 
a question, whether or not, if an exam-
ination is waived, is it not the same as 
an examination? Why these words 
are necessary at all? 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). This, as it now 
stands, requires an examination. If 
there wasn't an examination it would 
be error to take proceedings against the 
accused by information. 
The amendment was agreed to . 
Mr EICHNOR Mr Chairman, I 
move to amend section 13 by striking 
mg out, after the woid "commitment" 
and msert m lieu theieof, " the grand 
jury shall consist of seven persons, of 
whom five must concur on indictment, 
bu t no grand jury shall be drawn and 
examined unless in the opinion of the 
judge of the distuct, public interest 
demands one " 
The amendment was agreed to . 
On motion of Mr. Evans, oi Weber, 
the committee arose. 
The committee then arose and re-
ported t o the Convention as follows: 
Your committee of the whole, after 
examining and carefully considering the 
preamble and bill of rights, report pro-
gress. 
The Convention then a t 4:43 p. m, 
adjourned. 
TWENTY-SECOND DAY 
MONDAY, March 25,1895. 
The Convention was called to order 
at 2 p. m. by President Smith. 
The roll was called and the following 
named members were found in attend-
ance: 
Adams Kimball, Weber 
Allen Larsen, C. P. 
Anderson Lemiuon 
Barnes Lewis 
Bowdle Low, Wm 
Boyer Low, Peter 
Brandley Low, Cache 
Button Lund 
Buys Maeser 
Call Mackintosh 
Cannon Maloney 
Chidester Maughan 
Christianson M cFarland 
Clark Morris 
Coray Moritz 
Creer Murdock, Beaver 
Cunningham Murdock, Summit 
Gushing Nebeker 
Driver Patre 
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Eichnor 
Emery 
Engberg 
Evans, Weber 
Evans, Utah 
Fa r r 
Francis-
Gibbs 
Goodwin 
Green 
Hammond 
Har t 
Haynes 
Halliday 
Heybourne 
Howard 
Hughes 
Hyde 
Ivins 
James 
Johnson 
Jolley 
Keith 
Kearns 
Partr idge 
Peters 
Peterson, Grand 
Peterson, Sanpete 
Preston 
Raleigh 
Eichards 
Ricks 
Robertson 
Robinson, Kane 
Robison, Wayne 
Snow 
Squires 
Stover 
Strevell 
Symons 
Thurman 
Van Home 
Varian 
War rum 
Wells 
Whitney 
Williams 
Mr. President. 
Kimball, Sal t Lake 
Prayer was offered by Rev. S. J . 
Adams, B a p t i s t district missionary for 
Utah. 
The journal oi the twentieth day 's 
session was read and approved. 
Mr. Bo.ver presented a petition, signed 
by Frank C. Leonard and twenty others 
of the Christian Endeavor Society, of 
Springville, Utah County, for prohibi-
t ion (file No. 156). 
Referred to committee on schedule and 
future amendments and miscellaneous. 
Mr. Morris presented a petition from 
Edwin Dalton and 102 others, citizens 
of Parowan , asking t h a t the question 
of prohibition be submitted to the peo-
ple (file No. 157). 
Referred to committee on schedule and 
future amendments and misceUaneous. 
The committee on rules reported as 
follows: 
M R . PRESIDENT: 
The committee on rules, t o which w a s 
referred resolution (not numbered) re-
lat ing to morning sessions, herewith 
report the same, wi th the recommenda-
strikmg out "2 o'clock p m " on third 
line thereof, and inserting "10 o'clock 
a. m." VARIAN, 
Acting Chairman. 
Mr. THURMAN Mr President, I 
move t h a t the rules be suspended and 
t h a t the standing rule be amended in 
accordance with the report. 
Mr. STREVELL. I move to amend 
by making it 10:30 instead of 10. 
The amendment was rejected. 
The motion was agreed to. 
The committee on ordinances and 
federal relations reported as follows: 
MR. PRESIDENT: 
Your committee on ordinances and 
federal relations respectfully submit for 
your consideration their joint report of 
the accompanying draft of an ordinance 
on compact, and recommend its adop-
tion. We also report back the following 
propositions referred to us: 
File No. 118, by Mr. Maloney, of 
Weber. 
File No. 153, by Mi Raleigh, of Salt 
Lake. 
With recommendation t h a t the la t ter 
be referred t o the committee on schedule, 
future amendments and miscellaneous, 
HEYBOURNE, 
Chairman committee on ordinance. 
PAGE, 
Chairman committee on federal 
relations. 
The PRESIDENT. Under the rule it 
goes to the printers and will be put on 
the calendar of the committee of the 
whole. 
Motions and resolutions. 
Mr. CH1DESTER. Mr. President, I 
desire t o make a motion, and as a pref-
ace t o this motion, I wish to say t h a t 
the object of the motion is to secure a 
speedy action upon the election bill. By 
a speedy action, I mean t h a t i t may not 
be delayed by the act of the minority, 
who have informed the Convention t h a t 
they wished to make a report the other 
day. I believe t h a t i t is the object of 
some who do not favor this bill to delay 
i t and for t h a t reason the minority have 
no t made any report. Of course, I may 
be mistaken on this, bu t the circum-
stances go to prove to me t h a t 
this is the case. Therefore, I move 
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had no such law before. We have had 
nothing declaring this inequality, bu t 
they have been equal just the same. 
But there may a contingency arise in 
this country when this power, or ra ther 
this limitation upon the power of the 
s ta te government, will be exceedingly 
dangerous. I think t h a t it ought to be 
wiped out and left entirely to the Legis-
lature. For t h a t reason I am in favor of 
the motion to strike out. 
Mr. WELLS. Mr. Chairman, I desire 
t o state—the gentleman has said t h a t 
this is the same proposition t h a t is in 
the s ta te of Wyoming. I will say t h a t 
i t is also in North Dakota , Arkansas, 
Nebraska, South Dakota , Wisconsin— 
as many as t h a t and I don ' t know how 
many others. 
Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I 
would be in favor of the motion for 
this reason, t h a t there may come a 
time when the safety and defense of our 
government might require t h a t there 
should be a distinction between aliens 
and citizens, in regard to holding prop-
erty, and I think t h a t i t can be safely 
left to the Legislature. 
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the 
motion of Mr. Varian, of Salt Lake, w a s 
t o strike out section 21. Mr. Wells 
moves to amend by striking out the 
word "resident" in line 2. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I 
raise a point of order on t h a t ; t h a t is 
no t germane. 
The CHAIRMAN. If the point of 
order is raised, I shall have t o sustain 
it. 
The question was taken on the mot ion 
of Mr. Varian, and on division there 
were: ayes, 49, noes, 43. 
Section 21 w a s stricken out. 
Section 22 w a s read as follows: 
Section 22. Neither slavery nor invol-
un ta ry servitude, except as a punish-
ment for crime, whereof the p a r t y shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist in 
this State. 
Mr, WHITNEY. Mr. Chairman, I 
_ — 1 9 - - 1 - J - -3 L. i 1 * Ck 
t ha t the word "whereof" be stricken 
out and the words, "of which" be sub-
stituted. ^ 
Mr. EICHNOR. I think tha t is t h | 
language of the Constitution of th i 
United States. , ' | 
Mr. WELLS. Exactly. :-j 
Mr. EICHNOR. I believe in adherin! 
to the Constitution of the United Stated 
when we copy it. j | 
Mr. WHITNEY. I t is a hundred 
years old. ^ | 
The question being taken on ti l l 
motion of Mr. Whitney, the amend? 
ment was rejected. ^1 
Section 23 was read as follows: .ill 
Section 23. Private property shall 
no t be taken or damaged for public usi 
wi thou t just compensation. | j | 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, | 
move an amendment by adding th& 
words "first m a d e / ' so t h a t his corral 
pensation shall be made before the prop! 
erty is taken. Tha t is in accord with; 
most of the constitutions. 
Mr. ROBERTS. Does t h a t mean 
fore the damage is done? r||j 
Mr. THURMAN. No; I move to s t r i | | 
ou t the words "or damaged." ^ | J 
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. Chairman, I cM 
for a division of that—there are tw& 
"•'.41$ 
motions. -:^§ 
The CHAIRMAN. The chair will; J j j 
vide the motion so t h a t the question,®]|| 
striking out "or damaged' ' will first;®! 
,J$M voted upon. . 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr 
would like to suggest to the gentleman! 
Chairman,|g| 
Mi-. Varian, t ha t xrt^ i from Salt Lake, 
purpose in offering this amendment #§] 
t o provide for a compensation heiiig| 
made before the property is taken. U||| 
the words "or damaged" are put^&| 
there t h a t cannot be very well d e t $ l 
mined. There ought to be a 
section covering the damage of tlft 
property. -tj 
Mr. VARIAN; Mr. Chairman, IM 
in accord with the motion of the 
t leman to require the compensation ti|j 
- .«^ , -^ , - . 4-.- +hnit;/ 
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to strike out "or damaged" is a very 
material matter. I have taken pains 
to look at . i t a little to-day in the late 
works on eminent domain, and I find 
it is put in.other constitutions or stat-
utes to meet the entire case. In some 
states some courts have held t h a t dam-
age to property of a consequential kind 
was not necessarily within the meaning 
of the article of the constitution. For 
instance, I believe in Pennsylvania—I 
may have confounded the state—the 
question arose where an elevated road 
was erected upon a street and while it 
did not touch the property of the abut-
ting owner, did not destroy a brick, did 
not take a foot of his ground, it did af-
fect his use and occupation of his prem-
ises very disastrously.. I t affected the 
convenience of the inhabitants of a 
house, and in this particular case, fol-
lowing later, it was held t h a t there, was 
no remedy. There was not the taking 
of the property. Now, the courts of 
New York went off in another direction 
and it is finally settled in t h a t case t h a t 
such injury as t h a t could be compen-
sated under the law of eminent domain. 
To make it perfectly clear this word has 
been pu t in laws and constitutions, and 
the text-writers say t h a t i t is an equiv-
alent for any kind of Injury of t h a t 
land. 
Mr. THUKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I 
agree t h a t the compensation ought to 
to be made, bu t the trouble would be to 
make it first in the case of a consequen-
tial damage. 
Mr. FARE. I do no t see why. Take 
a case like tha t . * I t could be estimated. 
There could be no subsequent change; 
there is the railroad; there is the house; 
there are the windows; there, is the 
deprivation of light and air; there are 
all the necessary inconveniences of noise 
and soot and cinders, and disturbing 
the peace and rest of the family. T h a t 
fian be compensated for just as well in 
the beginning as i t can after the lapse 
of ten years, because the means of ar-
knowleclg^ of men and can be adduced 
before a jury. I do not care how the 
gentleman does it. I do not wish to be 
technical about it; I would like to see 
those words, "or damaged," kept in 
some way. 
I hope those words, "or damaged," 
will remain in t h a t section. I do not 
wish to argue the point, but I can see 
in a great many instances where it 
would be very important . For instance, 
on a sidewalk, a person owning land; 
they dig down a bank tenor fifteen feet, 
and damage t h a t lot to a great extent. 
I think the man should be remunerated 
for the damage done to his lot. I move 
t h a t those words remain in t h a t section 
if they possibly can remain there. 
Mr. THUKMAN. Mr. Chairman, my 
objection to the words "o rdamaged" 
is the ut ter impracticability of pro-
viding for compensation before the 
damage is clone. Now, I will cite an 
instance familar t o a great many. A 
few years ago people in Salt Lake 
County placed some boards in a dam 
here a t the point of the mountain: 
they had a r ight to do t h a t if they did 
not damage anybody and I don ' t sup-
pose they thought they would damage 
anybody, a t the sam.e time they did it: 
J>ut the result was t h a t a great many 
people in Utah County were damaged, 
after the act which caused the damage. 
Now, in a case of t h a t kind how would 
compensation be made before the act 
was done which caused the damage? 
Damage is not always—in fact is not 
often contemplated or expected. I t 
comes unlooked for as the consequence 
of an act which the pa r ty performs.. 
Consequently i t seems to me t h a t as t o 
taking property by the law of eminent 
domain they should have the r ight t o . 
take it when they pay for it, if the ne-
cessity for taking it exists. As regards 
damaging it, why, i t ought t o be paid 
for as soon as the damage can be ascer-'. 
tained. I t seems to me t h a t this is the 
only wav t h a t it can be done. 
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understand the gentleman correctly, 
from Utah County, he would be in 
favor of striking out the words, "or 
damaged." Gentlemen, 1 hope this 
amendment will prevail. Jm-t for the 
very reason that the gentleman from 
Weber County said it should be in the 
Constitution. Take a city like Salt 
Lake, where grading is required, or any 
other city where grading is required, 
and you will bankrupt those cities if 
you place this in the Constitution. 
Every man that owns property in the 
street—the street will be graded and 
one or two or three people will claim 
damages and the result will be it will 
bring the municipalities into court. 
Mr. VARIAN. Would not the com-
pensation benefit always allowed in a 
case of that kind more than equalize 
the damage? 
Mr. EICHNOR. The law is unsettled 
at present in regard to the grading of 
streets whether they can secure dam-
ages; it would simply bankrupt Salt 
Lake City, I tell you that, gentle-
men, if y )^u place this in the Consti-
tution. 
Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman, I am 
in favor of retaining the words "or 
damaged." I recollect a spectacle a few 
years ago of grading in Salt Lake City. 
There was a certain street—I believe it 
was State street—the grade had been 
established for some years, and the city 
came in and established a different grade 
and built the street up some ten feet 
higher than property abutting on it. 
There is a spectacle where they could 
not get any damages for it, and the 
street as it was built absolutely de-
stroyed the value of their property and 
they could not get a cent for that. I 
say that it ought to be fixed so that 
the city must adjust the g^ade for the 
accommodation of people that own 
property along a certain street and 
that is the reason that I am anxious 
that the words "or damaged" should be 
left in. And in speaking to the re-
read a line or two troni Lewis in his 
work upon Eminent Domain: 
"When the people of Illinois revised 
their constitution in 1870, they intro-
duced an important change into the 
provision respecting the power of emi-
nent domain. The provision reads as 
follows: 'Private property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.' Every other state 
which has revised its constitution since 
1870, except North Carolina, which 
never had any provision on the subject, 
has followed the excimple set by Illinois 
by adding the word 'damaged' or its 
equivalent to the provision in question.'' 
And the question not only refers to 
street grades in cities, but refers to 
grades of railway property. For in-
stance, it is unfair that a railroad should 
run right next to a man 's front door or 
almost next to his front door, and that 
his property should be destroyed or 
half the value taken away without 
making some compensation for that 
property which is really not reached, 
as no part of the property is taken; 
that is, the part of the property that is 
damaged; and I say I am in favor of 
being liberal in eminent domain act, but 
whenever we grant this liberty to cor-
porations in any way—public or private 
corporations, we should make them pay 
for whatever they take, and I believe 
the words "or damaged" should remain 
in the Constitution. 
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I am 
opposed to the motion to strike out the 
words "or damaged." I believe, as has 
been said already in this discussion, 
that when the public use a man's prop-
erty or make an improvement that vir-
tually destroys the use of that property, 
that they should pay for it as much as 
if the property itself were taken. Of 
course, as has been suggested by the 
gentleman from Salt Lake, whatever 
benefit results by reason of this im-
provement is setoff against the damage 
that is caused, and in that way the 
public gets absolute justice in relation 
to the matter, but to say that a public 
corooration should be permitted by the 
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raising* of a grade or by the lowering* of 
a grade or by any other kind of im-
provement to injure private property 
and because they don' t actually enter 
upon and take the property itself, 
although they do destroy the use of 
the property, t h a t they should be liable 
for damage; I think it is unjust and 
unfair and I am therefore opposed to 
this motion. 
Mr. RALEIGH. Mr. Chairman, I pro-
pose a slight amendment, "Private 
property shall not be taken for public 
use or damage without just compensa-
tion first be made." Simply a recon-
struction of the section, t h a t is all. 
The CHAIRMAN. The chair rules 
t h a t t h a t would be a proper question 
on revision and compilation. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I 
will wi thdraw the motion to amend as 
far as "or damaged" is concerned if it is 
not objected to . 
Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman, I don ' t 
think t h a t 'first made" should be put 
in there* If I recollect the s t a tu te cor-
rectly now, whenever a corporation is 
permitted to enjoy the benefits of the 
eminent domain act and desires to take 
property a t all, before they can do it 
they have to apply to the court-, and it 
is within the discretion of the court t o 
fix a bond and require good sureties 
before t h a t property is taken, and I 
believe i t should be left to the Legisla-
ture as to how it shall be taken. This 
is simply a declaration of principles 
t h a t it shall no t be taken. The Legis-
lature can require any corporation 
either private or public, t o put up a 
bond before they take anybody's prop-
erty or damage it, wi thout any cons U-
tut ional provision. 
Mr. CREER. Mr. Chairman, I am in 
favor of the motion of the gentleman 
from Utah, t h a t the amendment shall 
be added t o the section for the reason 
t h a t notwi ths tanding the gentleman 
from Sal t Lake says compensation may 
be secured, yet we know of cases—there 
erty has been taken and the par ty dis-
possessed and t h a t the property be liti-
gated for for considerable length of time 
and the par ty kept out of possession, 
no twi ths tand ing there may be a bond 
there, and a t the same time probably he 
would have to sue upon the bond 
afterwards. I think it is a very strong 
proposition anyway to give the public 
a r ight to dispossess a private person of 
his proper ty summarily and it seems to 
me he ought to be compensated before 
t h a t is done, because he may be put to 
a great inconvenience and loss of time. 
He may have to sue even upon the bond 
after he should vindicate his rights in 
the court. Therefore, I am in favor 
t h a t if t h a t should be required, he 
should be first compensated before his 
proper ty is taken. 
Mr. GOODWIN. Mr. Chairman, I do 
no t believe the committee can pass 
such an amendment. Emergencies may 
arise when it would be simply impos-
sible to carry it out. What there 
ought t o be is a law (and t h a t belongs 
to the Legislature) t o compel fair t reat-
ment bo th ways . I t is true t h a t rail-
road companies have had the right of 
way, and they own and have owned 
for th i r ty years where they have gone 
through. I t is just as t rue t h a t if you 
t ry to build a railroad through some 
back street in Provo, or up t o some 
mining camp, you would find your-
self confronted wi th the most ridiculous 
proper ty values you ever heard of, and 
every man in t h a t t o w n t h a t you would 
get as an appraiser would raise the 
price. I t is all r ight as it is; let the 
Legislature fix i t sometime within a 
year t h a t the proper ty shall be paid for 
and t h a t the p a r t y tak ing the property 
shall give ample bonds. In this bill of 
r ights i t is simply foolish t o pu t some-
thing t h a t cannot be executed, because 
emergencies would arise in the mines, 
in the cities, and in the fields, where 
there are floods t h a t would make it im-
possible. Sometimes thp thino- \a +^ K~ 
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